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Abstract: Economic activities affect the environment through a multiplicity of channels. Besides generating GHG
emissions that induce climatic changes, every modern economy is connected to the environment throughout a
continuous flow of materials. To generate economic wealth, a modern economy demands natural resources, and
produces a continuous flow of waste. The scarcity of natural resources and the negative externalities arising
along the life cycle of the resources from the extraction of the resources to their transformation, the use of the
final products and eventually the final disposal of the latter seem natural motivations for the current policy
push towards a more dematerialized and a more circular economy. The EU in particular appears to be
approaching a new frontier of the environmental policy. The main contribution of this paper is a qualitative
assessment of this strategy. To this aim, we first investigate the theoretical and political rationale for the EU to
foster dematerialization, and on this basis, we provide an economic assessment of the effective feasibility of the
initiative. From a theoretical economics point of view, the paper provides an overview of the main externalities
arising from materials’ extraction, use and disposal. In a policy perspective, the paper reviews the state of affairs
of the major world countries (USA, Japan and China in particular) on this issue, and contextualizes the EU
action in a global perspective. This paper investigates whether in this policy field the EU can globally play a
decisive role by itself or its role may be limited to providing a good example for other countries to follow, as in
the case of the reduction of GHG emissions. In the second part of the paper we discuss some of the most
promising policies put forward by the DYNAMIX project. On the basis of the qualitative policy assessment
performed in DYNAMIX, we illustrate why these measures might be worth serious consideration. A discussion
regarding the political economy of the policies under scrutiny complements the analysis of their effectiveness
and efficiency.
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1.

Introduction

In recent years, global consumption of natural resources has drastically increased (Krausmann et al. 2009).
In terms of growth rates, these have more than doubled over the last decade, and in some cases, they reached
unprecedented levels in the range of five percent per year (Global Material Flows Database, 2016). This
evolution, which is mostly due to the acceleration in the growth process in emerging countries (e.g. China and
India), raises two major concerns. One relates to the resource limitedness problem (i.e. the fact that the stock of
resources on Earth is finite and even if some resources naturally regenerate, all resource stocks may be
exhausted if not properly managed), the other comes from the simple intuition that larger extracted quantities
inevitably mean larger externalities. Negative environmental impacts arise in connection with extraction and
refinement activities as well as with the transformation of raw materials into finished products. Once the latter
reach the end of their economic life, they eventually become waste, which is usually a further source of
externalities.
There are contrasting views in the academic debate ranging from irrelevance (e.g. Lomborg, 2001;
Lomborg, 2004; Simon, 1980; Simon, 1981) to the belief that a different growth paradigm is simply necessary, in
order to better combine income growth and environmental preservation. This paradigm is currently known as
green growth or sustainable growth (Ayres, 2008). According to Bowen and Hepburn (2014), green growth
refers to the possibility of “preserving or enhancing aggregate natural capital within a specific area, or possibly
the planet as a whole” while maintaining positive income growth. It is assumed that the adverse environmental
impacts of the economy (broadly referred to below as “pollution” and including also resource consumption)
should not exceed a maximum threshold, which corresponds to the natural self-regeneration capability of the
environment. If pollution is above this level, it cannot remain constant, but it has to decrease. This case is
contemplated by Robert Ayres who understands green growth as the solution to the “problem of maintaining
economic growth, while reducing pollution and/or its impacts” (Ayres, 2008, p. 281). These two concepts of
green growth are indeed special cases of a broader definition, which accounts for both the case in which
pollution has to decrease and the case in which pollution may remain constant.
The construct of green growth may be easily rephrased in terms of virgin resource consumption. Consider
the basic fact, originally observed by Ayres and Kneese (1969), that the economy is an open system (in
thermodynamic sense), which is embedded in the larger natural environment. The economy takes energy and
matter (i.e. virgin resources) from the natural environment and transforms them into (low-valued) energy and
other matter, which eventually goes back to the environment in the form of (solid, liquid and air) pollution.
Consumption goods, in fact are in any case destined to become waste, i.e. pollution. The fact that the economy
barely transforms virgin resources in pollution allows identifying green growth with the possibility of
maintaining positive income growth with constant or falling consumption of virgin resources. When resource
consumption remains constant or falls and economic growth is positive, the level of resource efficiency in the
economy rises.1 Higher resource efficiency obviously means lower resource intensity according to the
macroeconomic relationship that linearly links GDP to resource use. In this perspective, green growth means deintensification or, more appropriately, dematerialization (Bemardini and Galli, 1993). In formal terms,
dematerialization occurs when the growth rate of resource consumption is lower than the GDP growth rate. If
resource consumption is constant or decreasing and income growth is positive, we observe green growth. In
2002 the OECD started to label this development with the term absolute decoupling (being relative decoupling
the case of positive resource consumption growth at a lower rate than GDP growth).
This paper understands green growth as dematerialization, and it assumes the need for decreasing resource
consumption while maintaining positive income growth (absolute decoupling). It discusses a selected mix of
policies in order to assess their capability to foster absolute decoupling of the EU economy from the use of virgin
materials (i.e. wood, metals and non-metallic minerals). To this aim, it further specifies the concept of
1

This is indeed the concept used by the EU (EC, 2011) in its “Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe”, which was
preceded by the 2005 “Thematic Strategy on the Sustainable Use of Natural Resources” (EC, 2005).

environment that is used in the definition of green growth. It acknowledges that it is not a uniform aggregate
but it is composed by several parts (air, land, soil, subsoil, water, biodiversity, biosphere, ozone layer…) which
provide different goods and services to the economy. In this perspective, it differs from that strain of literature,
which assumes a highly stylized world and in this context derives formal conditions for green growth to occur.
Prominent examples of this literature are Smulders (1995) and Smulders (1999) who extend the standard Lucas
(1988) endogenous growth model to include the environment, and conclude that green growth (in the sense of
Bowen and Hepburn) is theoretically possible when sufficient knowledge is accumulated, in order to
counterbalance decreasing marginal rates of natural environment. Other authors, like for example Ayres and
van den Bergh (2005) and Warr and Ayres (2012) insert the environment into the economic system from a more
physical (i.e. thermodynamic) perspective, following an approach which is “consistent with the ideas of
Georgescu-Roegen (1971) and Daly (1979)” (Warr and Ayres, 2012, p. 97). They conclude that green growth
(intended as in Ayres, 2008) is feasible only up to a maximum growth level. Above this limit, it seems that no
green Kuznets curve exists, and pollution continues to grow with economic activity. Moreover, they find that
green growth may be achieved through general innovation together with specific innovation in the product mix,
in presence of recycling and a functioning circular economy. While these results are underpinned by robust
theoretical assumptions, they rest on models with only one sector, in which the environment is a single
unspecified aggregate, and the economy is closed. Thus their conclusions remain rather abstract and their policy
relevance is limited.
The need for more concrete policy advice motivates a second type of literature, which trades off the
robustness of general conclusions about green growth with more empirical considerations about its effective
implementation in the real world. This paper belongs to this second type of literature, which is concerned with
the concrete feasibility of dematerialization in the economy. Because of its focus on virgin materials, it does not
consider the links between the economy and the remaining types of resources, namely fossil energy materials
(and carriers) and biomass other than wood. This type of approach is a common feature of this second strain of
literature, which indeed complements the one mentioned in the previous paragraph. In the case of Dellink and
Kandelaars (2000), for example, the authors study how the flows of zinc and lead into the Dutch economy react
to a series of policies aiming at reducing their use. While the initiative may be successful in lowering the
intensity of use of these two metals, the analysis is unable to provide results about other materials. This does not
allow ruling out leakages from the sectors involved in the policy and other sectors in the economy. This issue
arises in the case of a recent study by the EU Commission (EC, 2014), which shows that absolute-decoupling
policies, although beneficial for growth, may lead to higher CO2 emissions, as a consequence of missing absolute
decoupling with regard to other types of natural resources. Another issue, which typically arises in this second
type of literature, follows from the assumptions regarding the number of sectors in the economy. In the multisectoral case, a GDP drop in one sector following to a certain dematerialization policy needs to be contrasted
with the aggregate GDP effect on the entire economy. This is important in the case of Dellink and Kandelaars
(2000), whose results entail negative GDP effects on the sectors where the use of the two metals is the most
intensive.
In the area of the dematerialization policies focusing on virgin materials, this paper concentrates on policies
fostering the socially efficient use (and re-use) of materials at firm level. It is based on the research activity
performed in the framework of the DYNAMIX project, which proposes a series of policies aiming at decoupling
economic growth in the EU from natural resource consumption. The DYNAMIX project concentrates on selected
aspects of the environment, which are air, land, soil, biodiversity, subsoil as a provider of metals and nonmetallic minerals. It designs three distinct policy mixes to promote absolute decoupling. Two of them focus
respectively on materials and land (soil) while the third has an overarching character. The DYNAMIX project
assesses the three policy mixes and the policies making up each policy mix from the environmental, economic,
social and legal points of view, and both from a quantitative and a qualitative perspective. The qualitative
aspects of the economic assessment are the subject of this paper. In this perspective, the present paper is
complementary to the literature which studies the opportunities offered by a shift in consumption habits. This
involves for example a change in the consumption patterns towards the so-called “knowledge-products -

computer software, new media, electronic databases and libraries, and Internet delivery of goods and services”
(Quah, 1999, p. 2), which have the major feature of contributing to income growth without requiring virgin
materials consumption. This is the idea of the “weightless economy” (Coyle, 1998), which can be found in
Smulders (1995) as well in Hepburn and Bowen (2013) who “observe [that] GDP is not synonymous with
material output” Bowen and Hepburn (2014, p. 412). Another promising research area is developing around the
idea of circular economy. This term (already used by Pearce and Turner, 1990 and by Ayres, 2008 with the
wording “dematerialization”) indicates those policies aiming at increasing recycling and reuse, in order to raise
the percentage of non-virgin materials in the production process.
This paper extends the literature on dematerialization (e.g. Dellink and Kandelaars (2000), EC, 2014) in two
directions. On one hand, it performs a qualitative policy analysis. To this aim, it gauges a selected mix of policies
pursuing absolute decoupling against the four basic criteria of the economic policy analysis (effectiveness,
efficiency, equity and feasibility). The core of the mix is given by a green tax reform, which includes a material
tax, with the aim of shifting the relative production factor prices in favour of labour and capital and a policy of
funding research and development activities in the area of resource efficiency. Considering the costs that
productive sectors could incur in as a consequence of this policy, we complement it with information policies
such as a measure aiming at offering targeted skill enhancement programmes in order to support firms in their
transition towards more resource-saving production processes. Since firms are usually regarded as costminimizers, and this does not necessarily completely overlap with resource efficiency, a material tax may reach
its goal of dematerializing the production process but may have a negative side effect, namely a less materialintensive and thus less durable production. To prevent this, we complement the policy mix with some
command-and-control measures aiming at setting minimum quality standards for certain product categories2.
On the other hand, the policy evaluation in this paper takes an open-economy perspective. In our belief,
this is necessary for two reasons. First, the EU is deeply integrated in the world economy. Capital, as a
production factor is highly mobile, and this deserves serious consideration in policy evaluation. Turner et al.
(1998) are among the first to highlight that firms may decide to migrate when conditions change (on this point,
see for example Bosquet (2000) and Chang and Berdiev (2011). Second, the EU is a net importer of virgin
materials, which enter the economy either in the form of raw materials or after transformation in intermediates.
The externalities connected with their extraction and their industrial processing arise in the exporting countries. 3
In the case of the policy mix depicted above, this means that green growth entails maintaining growth in the EU
while reducing environmental impacts also abroad. For policy acceptability in the EU, this is a crucial point. A
second issue relates to the risk that the policy mix above may fail to reduce the externalities in the exporting
countries. This question equally applies to the problem of natural resource limitedness, and it reflects the
unilateral nature of the policy mix under scrutiny. Recent developments in global material flows support the
notion that accounting for trade effects is crucial for assessing the actual progress towards absolute decoupling.
As developed economies shift towards services and resource-intensive production activities are relocated
beyond their borders, the "hidden" flows of materials embedded in trade increase (OECD 2015). In order to
gauge this risk, the policy evaluation in this paper considers two factors: the global flows of virgin materials,
which help contrasting the role of the EU with the other major world economies, and the political orientation of
these countries towards the urgency of reducing natural resource consumption. Together, these elements allow a
more comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of the policy initiative, as well as of its acceptability.
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The introduction of product standard may sound pleonastic in presence of efficient environmental taxes. These
standards are however useful in our case to tackle the risk of introducing in the market products which are of inferior
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reducing efficiently extraction and production externalities and in inducing some degree of dematerialization. Taxing
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comply with minimum quality standards, which is what we propose to introduce here.
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Our assessment of the policy mix described above yields four main results. First, a comprehensive policy
mix is far more promising than a single policy instrument, when the desired change in the economy is as
profound as the one required by a dematerialization process. This is indeed consistent with the basic
prescriptions of economic policy theory (see, for example, de Serres et al., 2010) in the environmental area, in
presence of multiple externalities coming from multiple market failures at the same time. 4 Second, a policy mix
such as the one proposed in this paper, needs a dynamic perspective for its complete deployment, in view of the
substantial shift it imposes on the economy. Every individual component of the policy mix needs to be adopted
according to a well-defined time sequence, which must take due account of the specific situation at the time of
implementation. From this perspective, it is important to distinguish between policies with a typical support
role (like, for example, skill enhancement programs) and those at the core of the whole policy intervention such
as market-based measures. A dynamic approach to policy mix design is also desirable for a better distribution
over time of the efforts required from the targeted agents in order to increase acceptability. Third, the analysis
indicates that the policy mix under scrutiny may be indeed successful in setting the EU economy on a path of
absolute decoupling, although the opportunities offered by offshoring or outsourcing material-intensive
productions may undermine the effectiveness of the whole mix in a global perspective. This result is in line with
the quantitative analysis contained in EC (2014) and it is partly due to the double nature of the proposed policy
mix, which entails binding measures on one side (i.e. a materials tax or enhanced product standards) and
supporting instruments (i.e. funding policies of research and innovation activities in the area of resource
efficiency and skill enhancement programmes) on the other. Last, we find that while the possible success of this
policy mix in achieving absolute decoupling in the EU is invaluable, it may be unfortunately insufficient to
reverse the current trend in worldwide resource consumption. This is due to various factors and in particular to
the high-dependency of the EU economy on external (i.e. extra-EU) resource stocks and to the relatively small
share of the EU economy in global resource consumption.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some basic information regarding natural
resource flows in the world and in the EU. Moreover, it briefly sketches the policy approach of other major
world economies towards resource consumption. Section 3 illustrates the methods. Section 4 illustrates the main
features of the policy mix to be assessed in this paper and Section 5 provides the results of this evaluation.
Section 6 concludes.
2.

The global context

The final objective of any dematerialization policy is a reduction of the extracted quantities. In the
hypothetical case of a closed economy, this follows automatically from a reduction in resource consumption. In
an open-economy framework, however the identity between extraction and consumption stops holding.
Domestically extracted resources can be exported, and internal resource consumption relies upon imports from
abroad. Because of the open-economy nature of the EU, our policy evaluation (Section 4) cannot neglect these
issues. Since the policy mix assessed in this paper targets resource use in the EU, this section first discusses some
data regarding consumption of virgin resources in the EU and in other major world economies. In the second
part, it presents some basic information about political initiatives in the area of virgin materials in China, US and
Japan. This discussion aims at providing the policy analysis with further elements, which can help better
circumstantiate the effectiveness and the feasibility analysis in Section 4.
To measure resource consumption, this paper follows the approach of DYNAMIX that adopts the Raw
Material Consumption (RMC) indicator. As RMC figures cannot be observed, but they need to be computed
using additional data (e.g. input-output matrices) and making specific assumptions, their levels differ from
method to method. In Wiedmann et al. (2015), the authors compare various studies and show that the gap
between results may be very high. In the case of the EU, comparable studies (e.g. Tukker et al. (2013) and
Wiedmann et al. (2015) fortunately deliver quite homogeneous results. This does not hold, however for the US,
4
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for which results in terms of RMC figures vary by more than 40% between Bruckner et al. (2012) and Wiedmann
et al. (2015).
The heterogeneity in computed RMC levels across studies needs serious consideration in any discussion
based on RMC figures. This issue however, ois even more crucial when it comes to policy intervention. In this
perspective, in fact the whole policy strategy in this area may be undermined an intrinsic uncertainty. Consider
for example the fact that the US and the EU are among the world largest resource consumers. Uncertain figures
about their respective RMC levels acquire political relevance, as they imply a shift in responsibility towards the
world for each country’s consumption levels. In more general terms this issue deserves due attention in the
assessment of the feasibility.
One important factor influencing RMC results is the number of countries, which are considered exogenous
in the computation exercise, and for which the domestic technology assumption is adopted. Clearly,
computations involving larger number of countries are preferable, with other things being equal. Similarly,
studies employing multiregional input–output (MRIO) matrices should be generally preferred to those based on
single-region input–output (SRIO) matrices. In our knowledge, studies of the first type are Bruckner et al. (2012),
Wiebe et al. (2012), Tukker et al. (2013) and Wiedmann et al. (2015). In this section, we rely on this last
computation as in our knowledge it is the one with the highest country-coverage.
Table 1 reports selected RMC figures from Wiedmann et al. (2015). This data shows that the EU is the world
second-largest consumer of metals and non-metallic minerals, with a share of around 17%. RMC figures indicate
the role that each country can play in terms of reduction of current consumption at the global level. Any country
can ideally control its level of RMC, but the effects of a change in that level on total world extraction needs to be
quantified through appropriate modelling instruments. Unfortunately, we are not aware of any study
quantifying the effects on world RMC of a unilateral change in the RMC by the EU. This lack of knowledge is a
crucial point in policy perspective, as it impairs a transparent communication of any measure aiming at
reducing current RMC levels.
Table 1. RMC data for the five world-largest resource consumers in 2008 (in megatonnes)
Source: own calculations on Wiedmann et al. (2015).

China

Construction materials
(1)
9,661.9
32.66%

Metal ores
(2)
1,449.4
20.76%

Total
(1)+(2)
11,111.2
30.39%

EU-28

4,974.5

16.81%

1,195.4

17.12%

6,169.9

16.87%

USA

2,849.9

9.63%

950.7

13.61%

3,800.6

10.39%

India

1,627.6

5.50%

150.3

2.15%

1,777.9

4.86%

1,435.7

4.85%

373.7

5.35%

1,809.5

4.95%

Japan
World total

29,584.8

6,982.9

36,567.7

Basic economic theory suggests that a given reduction in resource consumption (demand) by one country
translates into a lower change in the extracted quantities at world level, unless global resource supply is
infinitely elastic. This clearly presumes a "conservative" scenario, in which foreign economic actors maintain
their behaviour unchanged. Under this assumption, the national consumption shares in Table 4 can be
interpreted as upper bounds of the elasticities of world RMC with respect to national RMC levels. In this
perspective, a reduction in the EU resource consumption by an ambitious 50% would cause a drop in global
RMC by less than 7.83%. If the RMC in metal ores were to decline by 80% (as indicated in one of the Project key
targets) the effect would be no larger than -13.69% for global metal ores RMC. These results are clearly very
simplistic because they assume that foreign countries do not react to the lower demand for natural resources.
Under this proviso, however they convey the message that significant variations in the EU RMC are destined to
bring about quite contained effects on global RMC. On the other hand, several “less conservative” scenarios can
be imagined. If, for example, the RMC reduction is the result of a series of technological improvements, it can be

supposed that these rapidly transfer to other countries which adopt them and start reducing their RMC as well.
However, this is not necessary the case, as technology may be costly or the internal situation may hinder their
adoption (Resnick et al. 2012). Moreover, Table 1 shows that more than 60% of total RMC is due to five countries
while all remaining countries consume a much lower share of resources. This suggests that the aggregate
consumption levels of the five (or ten) largest resource consumers may be plausibly decisive in changing current
global trends in resource consumption. Although the willingness of these countries to act together in this
direction is obviously very hard to assess, we try to provide some insight in this respect in the next paragraphs.
In order to analyse the EU approach to dematerialization in a global context, we first provide an overview of the
EU Action Plan for the Circular Economy, which was announced in December 2015. While a number of various
dematerialization policies were implemented on the level of Member States, the Plan provides the first
comprehensive framework in this area at the EU level. Next, we compare the approach presented in the Plan
with policy actions in three major global economies: Japan, USA, and China.
In order to map the initiatives announced in the EU Action Plan for the Circular Economy, we apply the
policy classification used in the DYNAMIX project (Umpfenbach, 2013). The mapping approach summarised in
Table 2 allows us to distinguish several important features of the current strategy for dematerialization in the
EU. First, its scope is very broad and includes all the stages of product lifecycle. This is a notable change
compared to the current legal framework, as well as previous Circular Economy Package proposal tabled in 2014
(EC, 2014), which were both focused on waste management targets. Second, there are no absolute limits set for
the consumption of materials. This lack of strong policy targets in the area of resource efficiency stands in sharp
contrast with the EU approach to climate and environmental policy, where absolute emission caps are the
foundation for policy action. Third, the policy mix proposed in the Plan does not include any overarching taxes
related to material use, which could provide the EU-wide price signal to move towards more circular economy
(EASAC, 2015). Instead, the Plan focuses mainly on regulatory, cooperation-, and information-based measures
on the EU level, while encouraging the Member States to introduce tax measures on their own. These three
features confirm previous findings on the EU resource efficiency policy, which suggested that the latter is
framed mainly as an economic rather than environmental policy (Happaerts, 2014). All in all, this results in a
focus on improved material efficiency rather than on absolute decoupling.
Table 2. Policy instruments included in the EU Action Plan for the Circular Economy classified according to
DYNAMIX typology
Instrument type

Instruments included in the EU Action Plan
Revised legislative proposal on waste, including long-term
recycling targets

Revised product requirements in the Ecodesign directive

New or revised regulations on fertilizers, television and
displays, minimum requirements for reused water,
standards for recycling of selected products

Including guidance on circular economy into BREFs

Better enforcement and possible improvement of guarantees
on tangible products

Updated guidance on unfair commercial practices, taking
into account false green claims problem

Potential independent testing programme on planned
obsolescence

Differentiating financial contribution paid by producers
under producer responsibilities schemes in order to better
reflect end-of-life product costs

Encouragement for the Member States to use economic
incentives to affect consumer choices and waste
management


Regulatory

Market-based/economic

Public investments

Cooperation-based

Information-based


Enhanced Green Public Procurement
Public support for innovation under ‘Industry 2020 in the
Circular Economy’ Horizon 2020 initiative

Voluntary certification of treatment facilities for certain types
of waste, such as electronic waste or plastics

‘Innovation deals’ pilot project

Improved information exchange between manufacturers and
recycler on electronic products

Voluntary recycling protocol for construction and demolition
waste

Pan-European network of technological infrastructures for
SMEs

Improved cooperation with Member States for better
implementation of EU waste legislation, including electronic
data exchange

Guidance and promotion of best practices in waste
prevention and reuse, mining waste management plans
recovery of critical raw materials, pre-demolition
assessment, substitution of hazardous substances of very
high concern, and cascading use of biomass.

Potential use of Product Environmental Footprint as an
information instrument

EU methodology to measure food waste

Building environmental performance indicators

Increasing effectiveness of Ecolabel

Further development of the EU raw materials information
system


The move towards more material efficient economy is not limited to the EU. Policy initiatives in this area
have emerged in recent years in Japan, USA, and China. Japan is an early-mover, having adopted the Basic Act
for Establishing Sound Material-Cycle Society in 2000, followed by two Fundamental Plans from 2003 and 2008.
The Japanese policy involves a broad mix of measures covering the whole value chain, focused mainly on
material efficiency improvement through both research and development (R&D) support and product
standards, as well as providing incentives and removing barriers to recycling (Lopes and Bego, 2013). Similar to
the EU, most of the policy targets are relative rather than absolute, with a notable exception of waste reduction
goal (Bahn-Walkowiak and Steger, 2015). Focus on the material efficiency and recycling in Japan is motivated by
high dependence on imported materials, similarly as in the EU, while the framing and construction of the policy
mix stems from local institutional, cultural, and economic specifics (Lopes and Bego, 2013).
While there are policy initiatives focused on material efficiency in the United States, there is no federal
framework nor targets in this area (Fritsche et al. 2013). Public intervention occurs mainly at the state level and
focuses on recycling, while at the federal level EPA provides information and coordination campaigns
promoting the idea of Sustainable Materials Management (EPA, 2016). Thus, there is a significant difference in
policy stringency between the United States and both the EU and Japan, which may be explained by more
favourable resource endowment of the former.
China was one of the first countries to embrace the concept of Circular Economy in its legislation, by
adopting the Circular Economy Promotion Law in 2009 (West et al. 2013). Policy targets related to more efficient
resource use and reducing pollution are also included in consecutive Five Year Plans, which are the key strategic
documents in China (Ghisellini et al. 2015). While China is not as dependent on material imports as Japan or the
EU, the top-down Circular Economy promotion may be seen as a way to balance environmental and social
concerns with a rapid economic development (West et al. 2013), as well as address longer-term national security
and competitiveness concerns (Su et al. 2013). While the national policy provides consistent framework for

promoting material efficiency and recycling, implementation of the concrete actions on the local level remains
challenging (West et al. 2013, Su et al. 2013, Wu et al. 2014). There are also no absolute targets for material use
reductions (Bahn-Walkowiak and Steger, 2015).
Placing the EU approach to dematerialization in the global context allows drawing three main conclusions.
First, the current Circular Economy package is – together with the Japanese Sound Material-Cycle Society
initiative – at a global forefront of dematerialization policies, both in terms of scope and ambitions. Second, the
EU and major global economies still have not introduced policy mixes aimed at achieving absolute decoupling
of material use from economic development. Third, the current level of policy ambition is not likely to lead to
significant dematerialization (Happaerts, 2014, Bahn-Walkowiak and Steger, 2015).
3.

Methods

In this section, we briefly describe the criteria we use in assessing the policy mix described in the next
Section. Both our assessments of the single policy measures and of the policy mix as a whole are based on four
assessment criteria, effectiveness, efficiency, equity and feasibility, which usually guide policy assessment
(Rossell, 1993).
Effectiveness is usually defined as the capability of a policy to achieve a given target (e.g. OECD, 1999 in
Clinch et al., 2006) while efficiency contrasts the net benefits of reaching this target with the net costs of the
policy implemented to reach it. Both effectiveness and efficiency are to a great extent measurable, and hence
their qualitative assessment involves two types of evaluations. One is based on the results of existing
quantitative studies; the other is based on a series of more qualitative considerations, which are motivated by the
fact that both effectiveness and efficiency cannot be quantified in all their aspects, as this is usually too costly.
Equity has to do with the heterogeneity of impacts that a policy has on different groups within the same
category. Policy analysis usually focuses on three categories of actors, namely households, firms and sectors. A
policy may in fact worsen income distribution among different groups of families. At the firms’ level, small
enterprises and large companies may be differently able to cope with the same set of rules with important
consequences on their profitability. Different sectors, in turn, may unevenly be affected in terms of
competitiveness as a consequence of the same policy. A comprehensive policy evaluation clearly requires
reconciling various perspectives. Moreover, when a policy has a supra-national dimension, its effects may be
different across countries, and this calls for careful attention. In a wider perspective, if a policy is implemented
in a relatively large economy like the EU, this may also bring about several impacts on third countries.
Feasibility has to do with the level of difficulty associated with the introduction and the implementation of
a policy, even when the policy is in principle fair, effective and efficient. In the relevant literature (e.g. Caraher
and Cowburnb, 2015), there is agreement that an effective and efficient policy may be indeed difficult to
implement. Although important for feasibility, equity is not always decisive in this case. Effectiveness and
efficiency are necessary but simply not sufficient for successful implementation (on this point, see also Gago et
al., 2013 in the area of energy policy). Feasibility is far less easy to quantify than the first three attributes, because
it is mostly influenced by non-quantifiable factors, which have to do with institutional, social and even cultural
aspects. In general, it strongly depends on the types of actors affected by the measure, by their ability to convey
their own interests into the policy process and by the evolution of their interactions. Thus, it is quite difficult to
predict how different groups will react to a specific policy proposal and how they will behave during the
process leading to the final decision on it. Two types of studies can help shedding light on this issue. On one
hand, there are “studies of behavioral responses to environmental taxes” (Clinch et al., 2006, p. 961) such as
those reporting the results of the PETRAS project on policy options in the energy area (Energy Policy 34, 2006).
On the other hand, there are studies analysing the process behind the introduction of a new policy and how this
may be steered by various stakeholder groups (see for example Bødker et al., 2015 on the introduction of a fat
tax in Denmark). Unfortunately, however, studies of both these types are very few and their strict connection
with specific policy initiatives hampers in any case their generalization to other contexts.

4.

The policy mix

This section describes the main features of the policy mix, which is the object of the qualitative assessment
exercise in this paper. In order to illustrate the logic behind its structure, let us recall the standard sequence of
economic activities, which starts with the extraction of virgin materials and ends with their final disposal. We
group these activities into three phases. Phase 1 includes the extraction and refinement operations, which
prepare materials for their “first industrial use” (Eckermann et al. 2012). Phase 2 involves their transformation
into final consumption products. Phase 3 involves consumption and final disposal. Since the policy mix aims at
fostering the socially efficient use (and re-use) of materials at firm level, its sphere of intervention regards the
“first industrial use” of materials. Its aim is twofold, and it reflects the principles of green growth. On one hand,
it pursues the reduction of externalities related to the extraction and refinement activities. On the other hand, it
eventually contributes to reduce virgin material use. It is important to note that the objective of the policy mix is
not the internalization of the external costs of production, which arise in Phase 2. Once materials enter the
manufacturing process (Phase 2), externalities clearly arise from their transformation, but the nature of these
impacts is mostly sector-specific. From this viewpoint, a policy initiative targeting sectorial externalities is
basically a sector-specific policy, which ideally complements the intervention of this policy mix.
In view of its specific focus, the policy mix in this paper differs from any of the three policy mixes designed
in the DYNAMIX Project. That project, in fact has a broader focus on resources, covering land, soil and air while
this paper is concerned with virgin materials (metals and non-metallic minerals) and wood only. The broader
focus in the project mostly motivates the “Policy Mix for Land Use”, which aims at reducing land use impacts,
and some specific policies in the “Overarching Policy Mix”. Moreover, the project features a wider initiative
towards dematerialization, which directly targets the wider sphere of production (Phase 2), consumption and
disposal activities (Phase 3) and generally promotes a more circular economy. This explains the scope for a set of
specific measures included in the “Policy Mix for Metals and other Materials” and in the “Overarching Policy
Mix”. These are for example the “Circular Economy Tax Trio” and the green fiscal reform aiming at the
“Internalisation of external environmental costs”. The policies contained in the mix presented here partly belong
to the “Overarching Policy Mix” and partly to the “Policy Mix for Metals and other Materials” of the DYNAMIX
project5.
Our characterisation of the policy mix follows a sort of bottom-up approach. First, it deals separately with
the single policy instruments contained in the mix; then it provides a more comprehensive analysis of the policy
mix as a whole. Consistently with the general aim of the policy mix, the core instrument is a material tax, which
is raised on all materials that enter the production process for their “first industrial use”. The direct effect of this
measure is a change in the relative price system faced by EU manufacturing firms. In order to avoid import
substitution, the tax is imposed also on imports of refined materials. To improve both its effectiveness and its
feasibility, this instrument is meant as a part of a green tax reform (GTR) scheme. This implies an automatic
earmarking of tax revenues to another policy instrument, which has the role of supporting the fiscal measure.
Earmarking here is suggested only with a view to increase the feasibility of the measure. Note that in more
general fiscal perspective, earmarking may decrease the overall efficiency of the allocation of public funds (see
for instance McCleary 1991 and Bowen 2015). This second instrument in the GTR is a policy of funding private
research and development activities in the area of resource efficiency. We choose a subsidy (i.e. a market-based
instrument) to induce innovation because of the general agreement in the relevant literature regarding the
superiority of this type of measure in comparison to command-and control instruments6. In terms of inducing
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For a thorough description of their features, the interested reader is referred to Ekvall et al. (2015).
This is a standard result in the area of technological adoption, which may not hold in some special cases (e.g. adoption of
a specific technology for reasons connected to public safety or public health). In a Weitzman prices vs. quantities
perspective: (Weitzman 1974), this would be a typical case of highly convex marginal benefit curve for which the risk of
missing the right taxation level and hence inducing the wrong quantitative change is too high. However this line of
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firms to perform R&D, results are less clear cut, and, bar the seminal work by Magat (1978, 1979), where
command-and- control instruments are clearly out-performed by market-based ones, more recent works in
general cannot find an unambiguous ranking of policy instruments in view of promoting environmental R&D.
Even within market‐based instruments, Popp et al. point to a fundamental undecidedness of the ranking on the
basis of the available empirical evidence: the relative performance of policy tools appear to be ultimately
depending on the circumstances (Popp et al, 2009). Command-and-control measures may particularly help
improving the effectiveness of the material tax in the short run, when the price elasticity of resource demand is
typically low because of technology invariance. At the same time, the material tax may be beneficial for
feasibility because a GTR generally conveys a signal of commitment by the government to the policy initiative
(Bødker et al. 2015). Material tax revenues are not used for undefined budgetary operations but are earmarked
to the policy goal (Albrecht, 2006).
The policy mix is completed by two additional measures. One of them (a skill enhancement programme)
aims at further supporting firms on the path towards dematerialization. Firms face higher material prices, and
they would find it convenient to modify their input mix from more resource-intensive to more labour- (or
capital-) intensive combinations. However, this requires both technological improvement and skill enhancement
at the same time. While the policy of funding private research and development activities in the area of resource
efficiency aims at supporting firms in achieving the former goal, appropriate skill enhancement programmes
ensure that labour forces are capable of effectively coping with firms’ technological advances. The two policies
described so far (i.e. the GTR and the skill enhancement programmes) allow highlighting the intrinsic dynamic
nature of this policy mix. Both the policy fostering research activities and the skill enhancement programmes
deploy their effects in the long run while the material tax is associated with much faster effects. Since the
implementation and the unfolding of the effects of these measures have usually different time horizons 7, timing
in the deployment of the single instruments of the policy mix (sequencing) is a crucial condition for the
effectiveness of the entire policy initiative. .
The last instrument included in the policy mix is a set of product standards. As mentioned in the
introduction (footnote 2), its regulatory nature is motivated by the aim of avoiding unwanted side effects of the
material tax. The rationale for adding this measure to the policy mix lies in the discrepancy between cost
efficiency at firm level and material efficiency at aggregate level. A material tax might have the unfortunate
drawback of inducing firms to simply save on materials to contain production costs. A mere reduction in
material intensity, if neither compensated by higher use of primary factors (i.e. labour and capital) nor
supported by technological changes, may translate into less durable products with the final effect of increasing
waste flows. The product standards foreseen by this third policy instrument should help to contain this risk.
5.

Results

This section illustrates the results of the qualitative assessment of the policy mix described in the previous
section. The analysis follows the methodology illustrated in section 3. In the first part, it discusses each policy
instrument separately, while in the second part it reports on the outcome of the more general evaluation of the
policy mix. For sake of exposition, the four criteria described in Section 4 will be treated separately throughout
the whole section, although they are obviously interdependent.

reasoning mostly makes sense in a static perspective. In the perspective of inducing technological change, its applicability
is less straightforward. In a dynamic perspective (Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 2003) point to the superiority of taxes or
permits in inducing the firm to adopt innovation beyond the level prescribed of the standard, if the innovation gives a cost
advantage and hence allows saving on taxes or on purchasing the allowances. This however remains ultimately an
empirical matter, and more recent works in general cannot find an unambiguous ranking of policy instruments in view of
promoting environmental R&D..
7
A tax can become operational in few months depending on duration of the legislative process needed to make it
effective, and can be applied una tantum or gradually along several years; the other two measures typically take a few to
many years to yield significant results.

The green tax reform (GTR)
The quantitative literature on GTRs is quite extensive (see for example the surveys provided by Bosquet,
2000 and Gago et al., 2013) but the number of papers focusing on dematerialization policies is quite small, as this
topic is quite novel in environmental policy. Two contributions worth mentioning are Dellink and Kandelaars
(2000) and EC (2014), which share the same finding that a GTR with a material tax can be effective in reducing
material use. While this is alluring as a result, it calls for some caution, because both studies assume that capital
cannot migrate, i.e. firms cannot relocate abroad. In current times of globalization, such an assumption seems
difficult to support for an applied study, as it does not allow considering one of the basic reactions firms might
have towards costly policies. Of course, firms can outsource their material-intensive production tasks, since both
models account for international trade. This option however seems potentially profitable only in Dellink and
Kandelaars (2000) because the country coverage in EC (2014), which includes the EU Member States and five
other European countries, effectively limits the scope for firms to outsource. These differences in modelling
international relations are a possible explanation for the moderate GDP drop, which comes with higher material
efficiency in Dellink and Kandelaars (2000) while EC (2014) finds that absolute decoupling is possible. Another
reason may be that EC (2014) allows for technological change while Dellink and Kandelaars (2000) assume that
the sectorial material intensity remains unchanged. These two studies taken together thus suggest that the GTR
designed in this paper stands good chances to prove effective in achieving absolute decoupling. Moreover, they
lend theoretical support to the view that a policy mix like the one assessed in this paper needs a dynamic
perspective. In the short run, the policy may turn out to be quite ineffective because of the low elasticity of
resource demand to price changes. In the long run, R&D activities contribute to technological changes and
materials’ substitution possibilities in the production process improve.
Absolute decoupling however is not the final goal of the present GTR, which aims at reducing the
externalities arising from extraction and refinement activities. Unfortunately, the existing literature cannot help
in assessing the possible effectiveness of the GTR under scrutiny regarding its environmental goals. Nor
currently available data can, as shown in Sections 2. If the RMC in the EU falls because of the introduction of
such a policy measure, the level of domestic extraction (DE) is not necessarily to follow. EU extracting firms may
in fact react boosting their exports in order to compensate domestic demand contraction. Similarly, at the global
level, a reduction of EU material imports does not automatically translate into a lower DE, as showed in Section
2. Since the impact of a RMC reduction in the EU has unknown consequences on world DE, the same holds
regarding volumes to be disposed. Thus, these considerations highlight that absolute decoupling in one
individual country or in a region such as the EU does not automatically yield a reduction in the externalities
arising from material use.
Regarding the support policy to R&D activities in the field of material efficiency, the theoretical economic
literature is at best scarce, as in the case of GTRs. However, this is not really an obstacle for our assessment as
this mostly rests on some basic economic theory principles. Since Arrow (1962), it is well known that in a free
market firms invest in R&D less than is socially desirable and this provides an immediate justification for public
support to R&D and it is sufficient per se to believe that this R&D support policy can be effective. Popp et al.
(2009) argue in fact that the introduction of policies aiming at containing environmental externalities does not
imply higher R&D efforts by firms at all. Quite contrary in fact, taxes on virgin materials or on final disposal
may even discourage firms’ efforts in R&D, as shown by Honma and Chang (2010) in a game theoretical model
of Cournot competition. The structure of the GTR under scrutiny which encompasses an environmental tax and
an R&D subsidy seems to find wide support in the literature which quite unanimously retains that R&D policies
are important, but it is their combination with other policies that yields the best results (Popp, 2006 and Fischer
and Newell, 2008). In general terms, environmental externalities need appropriate correction instruments while
R&D support measures help improving the way this correction can be performed. In this perspective, policies
that promote material efficiency such as a material tax should be a credible and steady feature for these markets,
as they represent continuous incentives to innovate and have the potential to eventually bring innovations to
reach the market and to be adopted by consumers.

Efficiency is usually a major strength of GTRs. This type of policy, in fact, usually pursues a correction of an
environmental externality and brings about a reduction of another taxation measure, which has typically
distortionary nature8. In the specific case of the GTR under scrutiny, revenues from the environmental taxation
are used to finance a subsidy fostering R&D activities in resource efficiency, which are performed at a suboptimal level before the implementation of the policy. While it is true that there are no reductions in any other
distortionary tax, the present GTR allows financing a subsidy without additional taxation, which would increase
inefficiency9. From this perspective, the GTR under scrutiny appears to be an efficient instrument. However, a
deeper analysis in view of its implementation in the real world reveals two main concerns. Regarding the
material tax, recall that its goal is containing the externalities from extraction and refinement activities. A first
condition for its efficiency is that it takes in due account differences among material types. The extraction of
different types of materials produces in fact different impacts (see section 2). However, a uniform materialspecific tax is still a very rough instrument. The same natural resource can be extracted and processed for its
“first industrial use” using different technologies, which entail different external costs. The degree of
environmental friendliness of available technologies may vary from case to case. Moreover, every unit of
material employed in goods’ production can be either disposed or re-used, and this means again different
environmental impacts (both disposal and recycling activities generate externalities). Thus, the amount of
externalities associated with one single unit of the same material can vary considerably, and taxing all units of
the same material with the same rate turns out to be inefficient and counterproductive, as it also fails to
incentivize both the adoption of greener technologies and the re-use of materials. The second concern is related
to the R&D subsidy, which clearly implies management costs. A relevant category of costs is associated with the
procedures for the selection of projects and the deployment of funds. While it is true that these may follow
already existing schemes, this does not exclude the possibility of inadequate or biased selection procedures that
may jeopardise the overall efficiency of the measure. Clearly an issue of asymmetric information arises.
Proponents of research projects really know about their ability to perform the activities detailed in their
proposals, the quality of their scientific staff and of the original methodologies they intend to deploy within the
project much better than the funding institution, which has only indirect information on these aspects, mostly
based on the reputation of the proponent. A major risk is that an invariant selection process induces learning
effects in the applicants, without guaranteeing quality in the research activity to be performed. It is thus
advisable to revise research proposal evaluation criteria periodically, and to envisage, if the amount of funds
allows it, different funding programs, with different scope and selection criteria, in order to capture different
profiles of research institutions and finance both fundamental and applied R&D.
Equity is a well-known issue for most environmental taxes, and GTRs are no exception to this rule. Since
they tax consumption throughout the whole value chain, and they lower other more distortionary (but
progressive!) tax measures, a wide literature agrees on GTRs’ regressive effects (e.g. Gago et al., 2013, EEA, 2011;
Ekins and Speck, 2011, Böhringer and Müller, 2014). However, two main features differentiate the GTR under
scrutiny from similar measures and help mitigating its regressivity. First, the present GTR targets the use of
wood, metals and non-metallic minerals at firm level. One can thus expect that this measure does not affect too
much the price level of the goods used to satisfy primary needs. The magnitude of the negative distributional
effects also depends on which and how many the goods targeted by the tax. Second, the GTR under scrutiny
does not include any tax reduction, which means that equity is threatened only once, i.e. by the environmental
tax. Regarding the impacts of GTRs on sectorial competitiveness, the literature is not unanimous on this. OECD
(2004), Agnolucci (2011), Speck et al. (2011) find the effects on sectorial competitiveness to be negligible while
Bosquet (2000), in the context of energy policies, finds quite opposite empirical evidence. The negative effects on
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Baylor (2005: 3) provides a review of rankings of tax distortions in general equilibrium models and finds that in “neoclassical growth models […] capital taxes are the most distortionary, followed by labour and then consumption taxes
[while in endogenous growth models results] are more heterogeneous and vary across framework, settings, and ranking
criteria.”
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sectorial competitiveness in our case are probably higher than in more standard GTRs, which use revenues from
the environmental taxation to abate firms’ social contributions in the most affected sectors. This GTR structure
would also foster policy effectiveness, as it lowers firms’ convenience to relocate or outsource material-intensive
productions abroad. Since it contains an R&D subsidy, the present GTR tends to affect differently firms within
the same sector. While the material tax targets all firms in the same (proportional) way, we can expect that only a
(limited) subset of firms will be eligible for R&D funds. Although we all agree that from a positive point of view
all firms should perform R&D activities, theory suggests that this may not the case in the real world. Above in
this section we highlighted the risk of invariant selection process with consequent learning effects in the
applicants. Thus, we may expect that only few firms and in particular those with an established R&D division
will benefit from the subsidy while other (maybe smaller) firms will just face a competitiveness loss.
The feasibility of the GTR under scrutiny depends on which groups it mostly affects. Since it involves a
material tax on firms’ purchases of refined natural resources, targeted firms will be the first to oppose this GTR.
They will promptly start intense lobbying activities. An extensive literature maintains that firms are the best
organized to effectively convey their own interests 10. The case of the Danish fat tax, which was first introduced
and then withdrawn (Bødker et al., 2015) shows that firms tend react very determinedly against unwanted
policy proposals “by using tactics like filing lawsuits, supplying governments with industry-funded biased
research”. Thus, the government willing to implement the policy has to find support in other groups. These
entail firms in other sectors, which may indeed benefit from the policy, as shown Dellink and Kandelaars (2000)
and the general public. A part from some specific groups, which will quite probably support (e.g.
environmentalists) or fiercely oppose the policy (e.g. workers in the most affected sectors), the general public
can be thought of as a set of different actors, which unevenly perceive the role of the policy proposed by the
government (Karplus, 2011), and positions can be heterogeneous. The general public can be induced either to
support or to oppose a given policy, and public support is an important determinant of feasibility (see for
example Thøgersen, 1994; Alesina & Angeletos, 2005; Japhet, 2012). If the policy is based on widely shared
positions, this helps its implementation. Two interdependent aspects turn to be crucial in this perspective:
communication and trust between the government and the general public. The public must be enabled to
understand the reason and the objectives of the policy (Dresner et al., 2006: 902). From a communication point of
view, any policy needs to be clearly motivated by highlighting the issue to tackle and the chances for success.
This is of course no easy task to perform for a government. In the specific case of GHG emissions, Dresner et al.
(2006: 938), argues that “it is notoriously difficult to get the general public to care about […] invisible, abstract,
large-scale and long-term problem[s]”. In the case of the GTR under scrutiny things are at least equally difficult,
since data on RMC are very heterogeneous and the effect of a change in the EU RMC on world RMC is basically
unknown. These technical aspects will be promptly used by the opponents to this GTR to try to convince the
general public about the ineffectiveness of such a measure.
Regarding trust, several considerations are in order. Unfortunately, there is a basic “distrust of the
government and politicians in general, distrust of tax policies, and distrust of government intentions regarding
ETR” (Dresner et al., 2006: 902). The objectives of environmental taxation measures often risk to be mismatched
with the much standard one of pure revenue collection (Albrecht, 2006). The government needs to keep
environmental objectives distinct from budget or broader economic goals (Bødker et al. 2015). To foster trust
government can send specific signals. An important one relates to the governmental body that is in charge of
designing the policy. An environmental measure cannot be uniquely processed by committees dealing with
fiscal or economic issues but appropriate environmental bodies must participate to the process. In a more longterm perspective the government cannot adjust an already introduced (environmental) tax according to budget
needs and its design cannot pursue side-objectives like the minimization of administration costs for firms, as this
may compromise its effectiveness and thus its acceptability. In the particular case of a GTR, Dresner et al. (2006)
10

In the field of environmental policy, several authors conclude that lobbying activities can effectively influence the final
choice of the environmental instruments (Buchanan and Tullock, 1975; Boyer and Laffont, 1999; Aidt and Dutta, 2004) or
they may affect the stringency of the policy (see Oates and Portney, 2001 for a survey).

reports that the general public may even mistrust assurances that revenues are used as promised. High
transparency in their use becomes then a priority, which may be granted though the set-up of ad-hoc
independent bodies with the task of monitoring that revenues are not diverted to other purposes. The coherence
in governmental action is an important pillar of public trust. The proposed policy needs to be consistent with the
general picture of the existing measures regarding materials. The existence of other measures, which may have
a rationale in contrast with the one of the GTR, is clearly counterproductive11. Another aspect related to
feasibility and trust is coordination of GTRs within the EU. While recent evidence suggests that there is a
renewed interest in GTR at the Member State level and some readiness to cooperate in this area, the preferred
approaches to the reform differ significantly between the countries and any form of mandatory policy
coordination seems to be unattainable (Withana et al. 2014). This is also reflected in the EU Action Plan for the
Circular Economy discussed in Chapter 2. Furthermore, if and when the common policy framework is
developed, the EU Member States will have to agree on the level of ambition of the GTR. Analysis of current
state of resource taxation in Europe (Hogg et al. 2016) indicates that even if all Member States employ current
best European practices in this area, it will still play a limited role in the European fiscal systems, with revenue
amounting to less than 0.2% of GDP.
Skill enhancement programmes
A shift towards a more dematerialized and more circular economy requires specific green skills (e.g.
OECD/Cedefop, 2015). Both academic curricula and vocational training programmes should adjust to this new
requirement. The challenges faced by many workers in an economy heading towards absolute decoupling
would be different to those that they are currently facing. For instance, the development of clean energy sources
requires new engineering skills. Therefore, the opening of new university faculties and vocational training
programmes is needed to educate specialists in this area, who will be able to build, maintain and further
enhance low-carbon energy infrastructure through R&D efforts.
The main aim of skill enhancement programmes is to reduce the mismatch between skills that will be
demanded in a more dematerialized and more circular economy and current qualifications of the workforce.
Qualified academic staff should be able to conduct high quality research; enterprises will need professional staff
and engineers that are familiar with the solutions which reduce material use as well as medium level staff
trained at servicing new equipment. Therefore, the first challenge for Member States is to reform vocational
schools and provide incentives for the universities to adjust their teaching programmes, in order to allow them
to respond successfully to changing demand for skills on the labour market.
In order to successfully address the issue of mismatch between skills and education in the future labour
market, policy makers need to know the exact nature of the mismatch. Therefore, research programmes
targeting that problem are needed. The effectiveness of public skill enhancement programmes needs to be
carefully examined. Private enterprises are the main source of both demand and funds to finance green skills
(Ecorys 2010), and as such they should be actively involved in the development of skills enhancement
programmes. The key role for the state in this area is providing coordination for the activities of other actors, as
enterprises are in a better position to gauge which sort of skills are needed.
The skills enhancement programmes can potentially have important social impacts. Firstly, they reduce the
frictional unemployment, shortening the period of unemployment after a lay-off. As it is usually stressful and
difficult, skills enhancement programmes alleviate the negative social effects of labour market frictions. If they
are effective, they can constitute significant support for standard labour market policies. Secondly, if skills
enhancement programmes target low-income households in rural areas, they can contribute to poverty
reduction through an increase in labour market participation.
Product standards
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Consider, as an example, the case of Sweden in the metal production sector, which in 2010 was subsidized with € 40
million while the metal recycling sector received only € 0.6 million (Johansson et al., 2014).

The policy calls for technological standards for metals or metal products, aimed at reducing their use,
maximizing their reuse and fostering substitution with alternate materials when feasible. In general, the
economic analysis of environmental policy deems environmental standards to be inferior in many respects to
market-based instruments such as taxes and tradable permits.
Here we restrict our focus to technology standards and their possible role in fostering the transition to a
socially preferable technological paradigm. In this perspective, Popp et al. (2009: 24) note that the “Incentives to
adopt end-of-pipe technologies that only serve to reduce emissions must come from environmental regulation.
Therefore, it is not surprising that studies addressing adoption of environmental technologies find that
regulations dominate all other firm-specific factors”. In terms of the policy under scrutiny, if the policy objective
is the widespread adoption of a particular technological solution, then it makes sense to prescribe it in terms of
specific technological standards. Frondel et al. (2007), find indeed that in the OECD countries, the adoption of
end-of pipe techniques is fostered by environmental regulation (Popp et al. 2009). However if the real target of
the policy is a more generic environmental endpoint, it would be more effective to specify a set of market-based
instruments in terms of that endpoint (e.g. tax per unit of pollution emission) rather than mandating a specific
technology. In the case of the policy under scrutiny it is the first order of motives that seem to prevail, at least
when the aim is to improve modularity to increase the reparability and reuse of components, and when the idea
is to use other materials instead of metals when appropriate.
As noted in Ekvall et al. (2015: 181), “The idea of product standards with an explicit environmental purpose
might be more easily accepted if such standards are part of a dynamic policy package that begins with the
establishment of EU strategies for dematerialization. Increased R&D on recycling and material efficiency and the
establishment of discussion fora might allow for more ambitious product standards, which would make this
instrument more effective.“
Beside this need for coordination within a broader environmental policy reform, we notice that product
standards feature the usual feasibility characteristics of all command-and-control instruments: they are quite
simple to design, but require higher monitoring and enforcement effort by the public administration than
market-based instruments to ensure compliance. In the case of technological standards, this concern is
somewhat eased by, for instance, making the certification of compliance with the standard compulsory in order
to access the market for final products. Some residual leeway for non-compliance would remain for exports to
non-EU countries in the quite likely case that a global agreement on the standard is not reached, and to a lesser
extent, in the case of illegal commercial exchanges of sub-standard products.
Popp et al. (2009) point to a concern raised by the empirical literature about different regulatory treatment
of existing producers and new ones. It turns out that command-and-control regulation often imposes stricter
standards to newcomers than to incumbents, and such a dual system may worsen the overall environmental
impact by unnaturally prolonging the life of dirtier production processes. Thus, while it is probably
administratively easier to phase-in new regulations by targeting newcomers first, it is crucial that the same level
of stringency is quickly spread to the whole sector targeted by the policy. In this perspective, it is quite likely
that unless adequate steps are taken, Member States would adopt such measures with different timings and
implementation rules. Strict coordination across the EU invoked by the policy description is indeed very
important to achieving the desired results.

Overall assessment
This subsection illustrates the results of the overall assessment of the policy mix presented in Section 4. It is
based on a combined analysis of the effects of the four instruments together, and it highlights some major
relationships among the four attributes of analysis.
This assessment exercise complements the results of the existing literature on dematerialization policies. By
now, this literature is still scarce and divided regarding the economic effects of this type of policies. This means

that it is not possible to exclude the case of negative effects on the economy12. If economic effects are negative,
policy effectiveness becomes crucial for political feasibility and for the entire policy initiative. However, for this
policy mix (and for any other measure aiming at reducing virgin material consumption in the EU) the evaluation
of effectiveness faces a major issue, which relates to the fact that the quantitative relationship between the EU
and the world resource consumption has not been quantified yet. Without this type of information, the effects of
a reduction in the EU resource consumption on global extraction and refinement externalities as well as on
global extraction trends are unknown. Under these circumstances, communicating the introduction of any
dematerialization policy to the general public and gaining support for it is undoubtedly a challenging task.
Another point regarding the effectiveness of the policy mix relates to the fact that the EU internal
consumption of refined materials is only a fraction of EU total material consumption. This is indeed a
consequence of the massive delocalization process of the recent years. This might suggest improving the policy
mix effectiveness by modifying the GTR in order to consider taxation of intermediates or final products. In the
case of intermediates the issue of double taxation immediately arises, with negative consequences on efficiency.
Taxation of final products, in turn, would present the efficiency issues (discussed above in this section), which
stem from the incapability of this type of taxation to adequately distinguish between more and less resource
efficient processes both at the production and at the disposal level. In principle, the same product may be
(partly) recycled, landfilled or incinerated, and these options obviously entail different levels of disposal
externalities.
A third point regarding effectiveness relates to the gap between short and long run effects of the policy.
While we can expect that in the long run enhanced R&D activities and the skill enhancement programmes really
drive firms towards higher material efficiency, in the short run there is a risk that firms react either relocating or
outsourcing the material intensive production stages, or that they even shut down. The option of protecting
these firms through corresponding trade measures is obviously prevented by the current world trade order, as
illustrated in many undergraduate trade policy textbooks (e.g. Krugman et al. 2014). Alternatively, revenues
from environmental taxation could be used to reduce firms’ social contributions on labour. This would mitigate
the impacts of the environmental taxation; however it would also cancel the opportunities offered by the
subsidy on R&D. In times of fiscal prudence, financing a subsidy of this type may not be immediately feasible.
The policy mix presented in this paper can be considered as an example of a concrete initiative, which the
EU could ideally undertake. The results of this qualitative assessment seem to unveil a fundamental issue, which
relates to the appropriate choice of the focus for the policy mix: the ultimate sources of concern regarding
materials use are externalities and resource limitedness. In this perspective, these should be the policy target,
rather than general dematerialization. Dematerialization is not important per se. It is important because it means
lower externalities, but if these are the foe to fight, then policies should have them in their core. Extraction and
refinement externalities should be reduced throughout the world while dematerialization remains the general
framework for action. Very likely, dematerialization would occur but per se this is irrelevant. In other words,
policies’ focus should shift from the use of virgin materials (and natural resources in general) to the activities
performed for their production and refinement.
This shift is not easy to put in practice, however, and a detailed analysis of this alternative strategy goes
beyond the scope of this paper. Here we just highlight some major issues, which may arise in its
implementation. Domestic extraction activities in the EU are less than ten percent of total world amount
(Wiedmann et al. 2015). Taxing these activities would very likely create competitiveness issues for the EU
extracting firms while would leave untouched most of extraction activities around the world. An effective
reduction of world extraction externalities would require a global initiative, which faces however two major
challenges. One comes from those countries (like for example China or India), which are net resource exporter
and which may simply disagree with policies affecting their own extraction activities. The other comes from the
possibility of free-riding behaviour among countries which is indeed very probable considering the high
dispersion of extraction activities throughout the world (see Section 2).
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Negative results of material taxation are provided by Dellink and Kandelaars (2000).

6.

Conclusions

This paper is concerned with dematerialization policies. Its main objective is a qualitative assessment of a
policy mix, which aims at fostering the socially efficient use of virgin materials at firm level. These policies own
their design to the research work performed within the DYNAMIX Project. The focus of the paper is much
narrower than the one of the DYNAMIX project (from which our analysis originates), as the only type of
resources considered are virgin materials (wood, metals and non-metallic minerals) and the policy initiative
targets uniquely firms while neglecting, for example, private consumption or disposal activities.
The overall evaluation of the policy mix is based on the separate assessment of the four main dimensions in
economic policy analysis (effectiveness, efficiency, equity and feasibility). In this framework, the analysis takes
an open-economy perspective, which allows accounting for the deep integration of the EU in the world economy
and for the role of other countries in global resource consumption.
This aspect is very important for policy effectiveness. In the area of dematerialization, quantitative studies
are still too scarce and divided to allow any significant conclusion. A major concern relates the effects that
unilateral EU material policies can plausibly have on global extraction and disposal externalities. This concern is
motivated by the apparent lack of reliable figures regarding the relationship between the EU and the global
resource consumption. To our knowledge, the effect of a unilateral EU dematerialization policy on global
extraction has not been calculated yet. This is of course a crucial issue for political feasibility as well, because we
cannot exclude negative economic effects of dematerialization policies. A last point hitting effectiveness of
material policies at the first-industrial-use level comes from the opportunities offered to firms by offshoring and
outsourcing material-intensive production stages, with the advantage of escaping costly domestic material
policies.
The paper shares the view that virgin material (resource) consumption is responsible for most externalities,
and it rises serious concerns regarding the limitedness issue. However, building on the policy evaluation, it
shows that initiatives, which set dematerialization as their main (only) objective, may prove economically
inefficient. This type of initiatives, which target material throughputs instead of externalities, miss the
opportunities offered by direct interventions at the point where externalities arise, i.e. at the extraction and at the
refinement stage. A material tax has to be material-specific, but this is not sufficient. Within the same material
type, it is necessary to distinguish between units extracted through environmentally friendly or unfriendly
processes. Our analysis confirms that dematerialization is a prominent objective to pursue. Reducing the use of
materials however does not entail unspecified measures on material throughputs, but it requires tackling
externalities, which arise in connection of material use. As this type of policies raise materials prices, this
strategy will ultimately lead to (hopefully efficient) dematerialization.
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